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Abstract
Research on the area of secure multi-party computation using a deck of playing
cards, often called card-based cryptograpy, started from the introduction of the “five-
card trick” to compute the logical AND function by den Boar in 1989. Since then, many
protocols with different properties to compute various functions have been developed.
In this paper, we propose a new card-based protocol that securely computes the n-
variable equality function using 2n cards. We also show that the same technique can
be applied to compute any doubly symmetric function f : {0, 1}n → Z using 2n cards,
and any symmetric function f : {0, 1}n → Z using 2n+ 2 cards.
Keywords: card-based cryptography, secure multi-party computation, equality
function, symmetric function, doubly symmetric function
1 Introduction
During a two-candidate election, a group of n friends decides that they should discuss
about the election only if everyone in the group supports the same candidate. However,
each person does know other people’s preferences and wants to hide his/her own preference
from the others unless they all support the same candidate in order to avoid awkwardness in
the conversation. How can they know whether their preferences all coincide without leaking
any other information?
In terms of secure multi-party computation, this situation can be viewed as a group
of n players where the ith player has a bit ai of either 0 or 1. Define the equality function
E(a1, ..., an) = 1 if a1 = ... = an and E(a1, ..., an) = 0 otherwise. Our goal is to design
a protocol that announces only the value of E(a1, ..., an) without leaking any other infor-
mation, such as the preference of any player or the number of players who support each
candidate (not even probabilistic information).
Secure multi-party computation is one of the most actively studied research areas in
cryptography. It involves situations where multiple parties want to compare their private
information without revealing it. In particular, this paper focuses on secure multi-party
computation using a deck of playing cards, often called card-based cryptography. The
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benefit of card-based protocols is that they provide solutions to real-world situations using
only a small deck of cards, which is portable and can be found in everyday life, and do not
require computers. Moreover, these straightforward protocols are easy to understand and
verify the correctness and security, even for non-experts.
1.1 Related Work
The first research on card-based cryptography started in 1989 with the “five-card trick”
introduced by den Boer [3] to compute the logical AND function on two players’ bits a and
b. This protocol uses three identical ♣ cards and two identical ♥ cards.
Throughout this paper, a bit 0 is encoded by a commitment ♣♥ and a bit 1 by a
commitment ♥♣. We give each player one ♣ card and one ♥ card, and put another ♣ card
face-down on a table. The first player then places his commitment of a face-down to the left
of the ♣ card, while the second player places his commitment of b face-down to the right
of it. Then, we swap the fourth and the fifth cards from the left, resulting in the following
four possible sequences.
♣ ♥ ♣ ♣ ♥
⇓
♣ ♥ ♣ ♥ ♣
a = 0, b = 0
♣ ♥ ♣ ♥ ♣
⇓
♣ ♥ ♣ ♣ ♥
a = 0, b = 1
♥ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♥
⇓
♥ ♣ ♣ ♥ ♣
a = 1, b = 0
♥ ♣ ♣ ♥ ♣
⇓
♥ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♥
a = 1, b = 1
Observe that there are only two possible sequences in a cyclic rotation of the deck,
♥♣♥♣♣ and ♥♥♣♣♣, with the latter showing up if and only if a = b = 1. We can
obscure the initial position of the cards by making a random cut to shuffle the deck into a
uniformly random cyclic permutation, i.e. a permutation uniformly chosen at random from
{id, pi, pi2, pi3, pi4} where pi = (1 2 3 4 5), before turning all cards face-up. Hence, we can
determine whether a ∧ b = 1 from the cycle.
Since the introduction of the five-card trick, several other protocols to compute the
AND function have been developed. These subsequent results [1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 16]
aimed to either reduce the number of required cards or improve properties of the protocol
involving output format, running time, type of shuffles, etc.
Apart from the AND function protocol, various kinds of protocols have been developed
as well, such as the XOR function protocol [2, 8, 9], the copy protocol [8] (creating multiple
copies of the commitment), the majority function protocol [12] (deciding whether there are
more 0s or 1s in the inputs), and the adder protocol [6] (adding bits and storing the sum in
binary representation). Nishida et al. [11] proved that any n-variable Boolean function can
be computed with 2n+6 cards, and any such function that is symmetric can be computed
with 2n+ 2 cards.
1.2 The Six-Card Trick
For the equality function, the case n = 2 is simply a negation of the XOR function, which
can be easily computed with four cards. For the case n = 3, Shinagawa and Mizuki [14]
developed the following protocol called the “six-card trick” to compute the function E(a, b, c)
on three players’ bits a, b, and c using six cards.
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First, the players put the commitments of a, b, and c face-down on a table in this order
from left to right. Then, we rearrange the cards into a (2 4 6) permutation, i.e. move the
second card from the left to the fourth position from the left, the fourth card to the sixth
position, and the sixth card to the second position, resulting in the following eight possible
sequences.
♣ ♥ ♣ ♥ ♣ ♥
⇓
♣ ♥ ♣ ♥ ♣ ♥
(a, b, c) = (0, 0, 0)
♥ ♣ ♣ ♥ ♣ ♥
⇓
♥ ♥ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♥
(a, b, c) = (1, 0, 0)
♣ ♥ ♣ ♥ ♥ ♣
⇓
♣ ♣ ♣ ♥ ♥ ♥
(a, b, c) = (0, 0, 1)
♥ ♣ ♣ ♥ ♥ ♣
⇓
♥ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♥ ♥
(a, b, c) = (1, 0, 1)
♣ ♥ ♥ ♣ ♣ ♥
⇓
♣ ♥ ♥ ♥ ♣ ♣
(a, b, c) = (0, 1, 0)
♥ ♣ ♥ ♣ ♣ ♥
⇓
♥ ♥ ♥ ♣ ♣ ♣
(a, b, c) = (1, 1, 0)
♣ ♥ ♥ ♣ ♥ ♣
⇓
♣ ♣ ♥ ♥ ♥ ♣
(a, b, c) = (0, 1, 1)
♥ ♣ ♥ ♣ ♥ ♣
⇓
♥ ♣ ♥ ♣ ♥ ♣
(a, b, c) = (1, 1, 1)
Observe that there are only two possible sequences in a cyclic rotation of the deck,
♣♣♣♥♥♥ and ♣♥♣♥♣♥, with the latter showing up if and only if a = b = c, i.e.
E(a, b, c) = 1. Again, we can obscure the initial position of the cards by making a ran-
dom cut before turning all cards face-up, hence we can determine the value of E(a, b, c)
from the cycle.
The six-card trick has a benefit that it uses only one random cut. However, the tech-
nique used in this protocol heavily relies on the symmetric nature of the special case n = 3,
suggesting that there might not be an equivalent protocol using 2n cards for a general n. In
fact, in [14] they found by using a computer that in the case n = 4, an eight-card protocol
that uses only one random cut does not exist.
1.3 Our Contribution
In this paper, we develop a card-based protocol that securely computes the n-variable
equality function using 2n cards. We also show that the same technique can be applied to
compute any doubly symmetric function (see the definition in Section 4.1) f : {0, 1}n → Z
using 2n cards, and any symmetric function f : {0, 1}n → Z using 2n+ 2 cards.
2 Basic Operations
First, we will introduce basic operations on a deck of cards that will be used in our protocols.
2.1 Random Cut
Suppose we have a sequence of cards (x0, x1, ..., xk−1). A random cut is an operation to
shuffle the deck into a uniformly random cyclic permutation, shifting the sequence into
(xr, xr+1, ..., xr+k), where r is a uniformly random integer from {0, 1, ..., k − 1} and the
indices are taken in mod k.
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? ? ... ? ⇒ ? ? ... ?
x0 x1 xk−1 xr xr+1 xr+k−1
In real world, a random cut can be performed by applying a Hindu cut, which is a basic
shuffling operation commonly used in card games [17].
2.2 Random k-Section Cut
A random k-section cut is a generalization of a random bisection cut introduced by Mizuki
and Sone [8]. Suppose we have a sequence of km cards (x0, x1, ..., xkm−1). We divide the
cards into k blocksB0, ..., Bk−1, with each block Bi consisting ofm cards xim, xim+1, ..., x(i+1)m−1 .
B0 B1 Bk−1
? ? ... ? ? ? ... ? ... ? ? ... ?
x0 x1 xm−1 xm xm+1 x2m−1 x(k−1)m x(k−1)m+1 xkm−1
Then, we shuffle the blocks into a uniformly random cyclic permutation, shifting the
order of them into (Br, Br+1, ..., Br+k−1), where r is a uniformly random integer from
{0, 1, ..., k − 1} and the indices are taken in mod k. This operation shifts the sequence
of cards into (xrm, xrm+1, ..., x(r+k)m−1), where the indices are taken in mod km.
B0 Bk−1 Br Br+k−1
? ? ... ? ... ? ? ... ? ⇒ ? ? ... ? ... ? ? ... ?
In real world, a random k-section cut can be performed by putting each block of cards
into an envelope and applying a random cut on the pile of envelopes before taking the cards
out.
2.3 XOR with a Random Bit
Recall that we encode 0 and 1 by commitments ♣♥ and ♥♣, respectively. Suppose we
have a sequence of k bits (a1, a2, ..., ak) as an input, with each ai encoded by a commitment
(xi, yi). We want to securely perform the XOR operation with the same random bit on
every input bit, i.e. output the sequence (a1 ⊕ r, a2 ⊕ r, ..., ak ⊕ r) where r ∈ {0, 1} is a
uniformly random bit.
We can achieve this by applying a random 2-section cut in a way similar to the copy
protocol of Mizuki and Sone [8]. First, arrange the cards as X = (x1, x2, ..., xk, y1, y2, ..., yk)
and apply a random 2-section cut on X. Then, for each i = 1, 2, ..., k, take the ith and the
(i+ k)-th cards from X in this order as the commitment of the ith output bit.
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? ? , ? ? , ... , ? ?
x1 y1 x2 y2 xk yk
⇓
? ? ... ? ? ? ... ?
x1 x2 xk y1 y2 yk
⇑ ⇓
? ? ... ? ? ? ... ? or ? ? ... ? ? ? ... ?
x1 x2 xk y1 y2 yk y1 y2 yk x1 x2 xk
⇓ ⇓
? ? , ? ? , ... , ? ? or ? ? , ? ? , ... , ? ?
x1 y1 x2 y2 xk yk y1 x1 y2 x2 yk xk
Observe that after applying the random 2-section cut, the sequence X will become
either (x1, x2, ..., xk , y1, y2, ..., yk) or (y1, y2, ..., yk, x1, x2, ..., xk) with equal probability. In
the former case, the commitment of every ith output bit will be (xi, yi), which is ai ⊕ 0;
in the latter case, the commitment of every ith output bit will be (yi, xi), which is ai ⊕ 1.
Therefore, the correctness of the operation is verified.
2.4 Adding Two Integers in Z/kZ
For k ≥ 3, we first introduce two schemes of encoding integers in Z/kZ, the ♣-scheme and
the ♥-scheme. The ♣-scheme uses one ♣ card and k − 1 ♥ cards arranged in a row. An
integer i corresponds to an arrangement where the ♣ card is the (i + 1)-th card from the
left, e.g. ♥♣♥ encodes 1 in Z/3Z. Conversely, the ♥-scheme uses one ♥ card and k − 1 ♣
cards arranged in a row. An integer i corresponds to an arrangement where the ♥ card is
the (i+ 1)-th card from the left, e.g. ♣♣♥♣ encodes 2 in Z/4Z.
Suppose we have integers a and b in Z/kZ, with a encoded in ♥-scheme by a sequence
of face-down cards X = (x0, x1, ..., xk−1), and b encoded in ♣-scheme by a sequence of
face-down cards Y = (y0, y1, ..., yk−1). We want to securely compute the sum a+ b (mod k)
and have it encoded in ♥-scheme without using any additional card.
The intuition of this protocol is that we transform a and b into a − r and b + r for a
random r ∈ Z/kZ, reveal b + r, and shift the cards encoding a − r to the right by b + r
positions to add the two numbers up. This technique was first used by Shinagawa et al.
[15] in the context of using regular k-gon cards to encode integers in Z/kZ.
First, take the cards from X and Y in the following order and place them on a single
row from left to right: the leftmost card of X, the rightmost card of Y , the second leftmost
card of X, the second rightmost card of Y , and so on. The cards now form a new sequence
Z = (x0, yk−1, x1, yk−2, ..., xk−1, y0).
x0 x1 xk−1
X: ? ? ... ? Y : ? ? ... ? ⇒ Z: ? ? ? ? ... ? ?
x0 x1 xk−1 y0 y1 yk−1 yk−1 yk−2 y0
Apply a random k-section cut on Z, transforming the sequence into (xr, y−r+k−1,
xr+1, y−r+k−2, ..., xr+k−1, y−r) for a uniformly random r ∈ Z/kZ, where the indices are
taken in mod k.
5
x0 x1 xk−1 xr xr+1 xr+k−1
Z: ? ? ? ? ... ? ? ⇒ Z: ? ? ? ? ... ? ?
yk−1 yk−2 y0 y−r+k−1 y−r+k−2 y−r
Take the cards in Z from left to right and place them at these positions in X and
Y in the following order: the leftmost position of X, the rightmost position of Y , the
second leftmost position of X, the second rightmost position of Y , and so on. We now have
sequences X = (xr, xr+1, ..., xr+k−1) and Y = (y−r, y−r+1, ..., y−r+k−1), which encode a− r
and b+ r, respectively.
xr xr+1 xr+k−1
Z: ? ? ? ? ... ? ? ⇒ X : ? ? ... ? Y : ? ? ... ?
y−r+k−1 y−r+k−2 y−r xr xr+1 xr+k−1 y−r y−r+1 y−r+k−1
Turn all cards in Y face-up to reveal s = b+ r. Note that this revelation does not leak
any information of b because b + r has an equal probability to be any integer in Z/kZ no
matter what b is. Then, we shift the cards in X to the right by s positions, transforming
X into (xr−s, xr−s+1, ..., xr−s+k−1).
X : ? ? ... ? ⇒ X : ? ? ... ?
xr xr+1 xr+k−1 xr−s xr−s+1 xr−s+k−1
Therefore, we now have a sequence X encoding a− r+ s = (a− r) + (b+ r) = a+ b in
♥-scheme as desired.
3 Our Main Protocol
We get back to our main problem. Observe that if we treat each input ai as an integer,
the value of E(a1, ..., an) depends only on the sum sn =
∑
n
i=1 ai. Therefore, we will first
develop a protocol to compute that sum. The intuition of this protocol is that for each
k = 2, 3, ..., n, we inductively compute the sum sk =
∑
k
i=1 ai in Z/(k+1)Z. Note that since
sk is at most k, its value in Z/(k + 1)Z does not change from its actual value.
3.1 Summation of the First k Bits
We will show that if we have two additional cards, one ♣ and one ♥, we can compute the
sum sk for every k = 2, 3, ..., n by the following procedure.
First, swap the two cards in the commitment of a1 and place an additional ♣ card
face-down to the right of them. The resulting sequence, called C1, encodes a1 in Z/3Z in
♥-scheme.
Case a1 = 0: ♣ ♥
Case a1 = 1: ♥ ♣
a1: ? ? ⇒
♥ ♣
♣ ♥
? ? ⇒
♥ ♣ ♣
♣ ♥ ♣
C1: ? ? ♣
Then, put an additional ♥ card face-down to the right of the commitment of a2. The
resulting sequence, called C2, encodes a2 in Z/3Z in ♣-scheme.
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Case a2 = 0: ♣ ♥
Case a2 = 1: ♥ ♣
a2: ? ? ⇒
♣ ♥ ♥
♥ ♣ ♥
C2: ? ? ♥
We then apply the addition protocol introduced in Section 2.4 to store the sum s2 =
a1+a2 in Z/3Z encoded in ♥-scheme in C1. We also now have two ♥ cards and one ♣ card
from C2 after we turned them face-up. These cards are called free cards and are available
to be used later in the protocol.
C1 encoding s2:
free cards from C2:
? ? ?
♣ ♥ ♥
Inductively, for each k ≥ 3, after we finish computing sk−1, we now have a sequence
C1 of k face-down cards encoding sk−1 in Z/kZ in ♥-scheme. We also have k − 1 free ♥
cards and one free ♣ card from Ck−1 after we turned them face-up. Append the free ♣
card face-down to the right of C1, making the sequence now encode sk−1 in Z/(k + 1)Z in
♥-scheme. Also, place the k − 1 free ♥ cards face-down to the right of the commitment of
ak. The resulting sequence, called Ck, encodes ak in Z/(k + 1)Z in ♣-scheme.
C1 encoding sk−1:
commitment of ak:
? ? ... ?
? ?
⇒
⇒
C1 encoding sk−1:
Ck encoding ak:
? ? ... ? ♣
? ? ♥ ... ♥
free cards from Ck−1: 1×♣ , (k − 1)×♥
Then, apply the addition protocol to compute the sum sk−1 + ak (mod k + 1) = sk
(mod k + 1) = sk and have it encoded in ♥-scheme by C1 as desired.
C1 encoding sk:
free cards from Ck:
? ? ... ?
1×♣ , k×♥
Therefore, starting with one additional ♣ card and one additional ♥ card, we can
compute the sum sk =
∑
k
i=1 ai for every k = 2, 3, ..., n.
3.2 Putting Together
The summation protocol introduced in Section 3.1 requires two additional cards to compute
sk. However, we can compute the equality function without using any additional card by
the following procedure.
First, apply the random bit XOR protocol in Section 2.3 to transform the input into
(a1⊕ r, a2⊕ r, ..., an⊕ r) for a random bit r ∈ {0, 1}. Then, turn the two cards encoding the
nth bit face-up to reveal an ⊕ r. Note that this revelation does not leak any information of
an because seeing ♣♥ and ♥♣ each has probability 1/2 no matter whether an is 0 or 1.
If the cards are ♣♥, i.e. an ⊕ r = 0, the equality function outputs 1 if and only if
ai ⊕ r = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n − 1, which is equivalent to
∑
n−1
i=1 (ai ⊕ r) = 0. Note that
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we now have one free ♣ card and one free ♥ card from the cards we just turned face-
up. With these two additional cards, we can apply the summation protocol to compute∑
n−1
i=1 (ai ⊕ r). On the other hand, if the two rightmost cards are ♥♣, i.e. an ⊕ r = 1, the
equality function outputs 1 if and only if ai⊕r = 1 for all i = 1, ..., n−1, which is equivalent
to
∑
n−1
i=1 (ai ⊕ r ⊕ 1) = 0. Therefore, we can swap the two cards encoding every bit so that
each ith bit becomes ai ⊕ r ⊕ 1 and then apply the same protocol.
Note that the final sum is encoded in ♥-scheme by a row of n cards, where the equality
function outputs 1 if and only if the sum is zero, i.e. the ♥ card is at the leftmost position.
However, we do not want to reveal any information about the actual value of the sum except
whether it is zero or not. Therefore, we apply a final random cut on the sequence of n− 1
rightmost cards (all cards in the row except the leftmost one) to make all the cases where
the sum is not zero indistinguishable. Finally, we turn all cards face-up and locate the
position of the ♥ card. If it is the leftmost card in the row, then output 1; otherwise output
0.
We use one random 2-section cut in the random bit XOR operation, n − 2 random
k-section cuts for computing the sum of n− 1 bits, and one random cut in the final shuffle.
Therefore, the total number of shuffles used in the whole protocol is n.
4 Applications
4.1 Computing Other Symmetric Functions
A function f : {0, 1}n → Z is called symmetric if f(a1, ..., an) = f(aσ1 , ..., aσn ) for any
a1, ..., an and any permutation (σ1, ..., σn) of (1, ..., n). A symmetric function f is called
doubly symmetric if f(a1, ..., an) = f(1 − a1, ..., 1 − an) for any a1, ..., an. For example,
the equality function is doubly symmetric, while the majority function is symmetric but
not doubly symmetric. Another example of a doubly symmetric function is f(a1, ..., an) =
a1 ⊕ ...⊕ an for an even n.
Observe that for any symmetric function f : {0, 1}n → Z, the value f(a1, ..., an) de-
pends only on the sum
∑
n
i=1 ai, hence f can be written as f(a1, ..., an) = g(
∑
n
i=1 ai) for
some function g : {0, ..., n} → Z. Also, if f is doubly symmetric, we have g(a) = g(n − a)
for any a ∈ {0, ..., n}.
Our protocol can also be applied to compute any doubly symmetric function. Let
f : {0, 1}n → Z be any doubly symmetric function and let g : {0, ..., n} → Z be a function
such that f(a1, ..., an) = g(
∑
n
i=1 ai). First, we apply the random bit XOR protocol with
a random bit r ∈ {0, 1} to every input ai and then reveal an ⊕ r (without leaking any
information of an since an⊕ r has an equal probability to be 0 and 1 no matter whether an
is 0 or 1).
Since f is doubly symmetric, if an ⊕ r = 0, we have
f(a1, ..., an) = f(a1 ⊕ r, ..., an ⊕ r)
= g
(
n∑
i=1
(ai ⊕ r)
)
= g
(
n−1∑
i=1
(ai ⊕ r)
)
,
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so we can apply the summation protocol to compute
∑
n−1
i=1 (ai ⊕ r). On the other hand, if
an ⊕ r = 1, we have an ⊕ r ⊕ 1 = 0, so
f(a1, ..., an) = f(a1 ⊕ r ⊕ 1, ..., an ⊕ r ⊕ 1)
= g
(
n∑
i=1
(ai ⊕ r ⊕ 1)
)
= g
(
n−1∑
i=1
(ai ⊕ r ⊕ 1)
)
,
hence we can swap the two cards encoding every bit and apply the same protocol to compute∑
n−1
i=1 (ai ⊕ r ⊕ 1).
For each b ∈ Im f = Im g, let Pb = {a ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}|g(a) = b}. Recall that an integer i
corresponds to an arrangement where the (i+1)-th card from the left being ♥. So, we can
take from the row all the cards corresponding to integers in Pb, i.e. (i+1)-th card from the
left for every i ∈ Pb, apply a random cut on them, and put them back into the row at their
original positions in order to make all the cases where the sum is in Pb indistinguishable.
We need to separately apply such random cut for every b ∈ Im f such that |Pb| > 1. These
random cuts ensure that turning the cards face-up does not reveal any information about
the sum except the output value of g. Finally, we turn all cards face-up to reveal an integer
s and output g(s). The number of required cards is 2n, and the total number of shuffles is
at most n− 1 + | Im f |.
For a function that is symmetric but not doubly symmetric, we can directly apply the
summation protocol to compute the sum sn =
∑
n
i=1 ai, apply the above random cut for
every b ∈ Im f such that |Pb| > 1, and output g(sn), although it requires two additional
cards. Therefore, the number of required cards is 2n + 2, and the total number of shuffles
is at most n− 1 + | Im f |.
4.2 Optimality
There is a protocol developed by Mizuki et al. [6] that can compute the sum of n input bits
using only O(log n) cards, but their protocol restricts the order of submission of the inputs
so that the cards can be reused. Any protocol that the inputs are submitted simultaneously
requires at least 2n cards as we need two cards for a commitment of each person’s bit, hence
our protocol is the optimal one for computing any doubly symmetric function.
For computing symmetric functions that are not doubly symmetric, the protocol of
Nishida et al. [11] also uses 2n+ 2 cards to compute any symmetric function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}. Their protocol has a benefit that the output is in committed-format, i.e. encoded in
the same format as the input (♣♥ for 0 and ♥♣ for 1), so the output can be securely used
as an input of another function. However, our protocol uses fewer number of shuffles and
also has a benefit that the output is not restricted to be binary, hence supporting functions
with more than two possible outputs.
5 Discussion
For computing the equality function or any doubly symmetric function, our protocol is
optimal in terms of number of cards as it matches the trivial lower bound of 2n. However,
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there is still an open problem to find a committed-format protocol that uses 2n cards, or
a non-committed-format one with the same number of cards but uses a fewer number of
shuffles. For symmetric functions that are not doubly symmetric, an open problem is to
find a protocol that computes such functions with less than 2n+ 2 cards.
Another interesting future work is to prove the lower bound of the number of cards or
the number of shuffles required to compute such functions, either for a committed-format
protocol or for any protocol.
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